As an aside, it has also been documented that African American women are known for their creativity in designing stylish garments that also attend to the modesty requirement. Id. at 13. 5 Yazbeck, Muslim Women in America at 103-107.
Debates around the niqab also preoccupy courts and the public in Muslim countries. In 2010, the Cairo administrative Court upheld a ban on the niqab in university examination rooms. 13 But in 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt found on religious freedom grounds that the American University of Cairo could not ban the niqab from campus. It was permitted, though, to require brief unveiling for verification of identity. 14 Turkey banned the hijab, niqab and burqa from its universities entirely, then took an about face on the niqab for a time, after the more comprehensive ban, which had been upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004, 15 led some girls to choose piety over education. When the Turkish Parliament reinstated the hijab ban, some university students took to covering their hijab-hooded hair with wigs. 16 Recently, Syria prohibited the wearing of niqab (but not the hijab) in its universities. 17 approved a ban against wearing the burqa in all public places. This bill was later rejected by a slim majority in the Parliament. However, the government announced it will introduce a different version of the bill later. and (2) burdens on religious free exercise, as they will from time to time, those burdens should be minimized. In considering means to further its compelling interests, the government must select practical means that are the least restrictive of religious freedom.
Although the state has a "compelling interest in making sure that visitors to inmates are indeed the persons they profess to be" the burdens placed on the veiled woman must be the "least restrictive." 33 Rather than excluding the veiled mother from visits, the court found that the prison should inform her of the visitation times and dates when female corrections officers are on duty, so that she can briefly unveil to establish her identity prior to contact with her son. because she wore the niqab, rather than to seek to accommodate her faith and lawsuit, was to ignore the demands of deference to religion.
It could be argued that since Michigan Rule 611(b) permits judicial discretion without requiring a judge to order the removal of Muslim modesty attire, it is lawful.
Ideally a judge would not use his or her "reasonable control" authority to exclude religious attire unless first determining that exclusion was necessary to further a compelling state interest. However the amendment was adopted in the context of a dispute over the niqab, precisely to authorize an interference with religious free exercise.
Given the rule's genesis and doubtful constitutionality, it is not surprising that the 43 The Board found that while sensitive, well-explained requests that a woman remove her niqab will sometimes be warranted by the facts and circumstances at hand, "it is often possible," the Board concluded, "to assess the evidence of a woman wearing a niqab." Judges sometime take evidence over the telephone and some judges are sight-impaired, hence the judiciary may not consistently presume that "the veil represents a true obstacle to the judicial task." 44 In sum, "In many cases, there will be no need for a woman to remove her niqab, provided that the judge is of the view that justice can be was reversed when he held a female attorney in contempt of court for wearing slacks and a sweater in court. 49 In the American northeast, slacks and a sweater are less formal professional attire than a black suit and tie. But, unlike Mickey Mouse ears, a Batman costume, a comically oversized sombrero, a pants and sweater outfit does not demean, trivialize or disrupt a courtroom.
Women of Muslim faith wearing the niqab are neither disruptive nor an affront.
They have a right not to be observed, so long as they can be seen, heard and identified in other straightforward and appropriate available ways. 50 As a constitutional matter, respect for religious freedom demands that there should be a very strong presumption against religious clothing bans and a strict requirement of accommodation in those instances in which the state asserts a truly compelling interest in undressing its people. U.S. courts should avoid the quick conclusion that the niqab is "a true obstacle to the judicial task."
The Botsford, 56 Citing the importance of modesty and privacy, the case had held that a woman who filed a tort action alleging physical injuries need not submit to a medical examination at the request of the defendant. The notion that tort plaintiffs need not undergo a professional medical examination is now obsolete, but the notion that women have a "right to be let alone" that permits them to keep themselves covered in public lives on. Government has a compelling interest in a judicial system governed by rules and procedures that enable those responsible for fact-finding-judges, lawyers, prosecutors and juries-to assess the veracity of witnesses and parties. The government also has a compelling interest in holding accusers accountable for the statements they make and serious allegations of wrong-doing the levy against others. As for veracity and accountability, niqab interferes with the obligation to confront those whom one has accused. Facing a niqab-draped woman satisfies the desire to look a person in the eye to compel accountability and thereby to assess veracity; but frustrates the ability to ascertain veracity on the evidence of overall facial expression and body language.
Demeanor is evidence of truthfulness and also of mental and emotional fitness to stand trial. Demeanor is evidence of character and of whether a person is making a serious effort to pay attention and show respect to others in court. Government has a compelling interest in a judicial system in which participants act with rationality, civility and seriousness. Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant's right to confront a witness was violated when the key witness testified wearing sunglasses so "dark… that you can't see through them." 61 The court held that the jury was still able to observe the witness's delivery, nervousness, and body language. The court explained that it was more important that the jury was able to triangulate the observed demeanors with the substance of the testimony, the witness's opportunity to observe, the consistency of the testimony, and whether the witness had any hostile motive. It could be argued that the right to confront one's accusers goes to core public values and undercuts the right to veil. But that right to confront accusers cannot be interpreted as a right to force a person who is completely willing to appear in a courtroom and questioned, to take of attire called for by her faith. The wearing of the niqab is a kind of personal religious conduct that courts must tolerate and accommodate.
As for identity, it is easy to verify the identity of a person whose full face is in plain view, but the female form behind the niqab could be almost anyone of similar 63 This case presented two difficulties. First, the burqa not only covers the face but the whole body; thus, the witnesses' body language would be difficult to assess beneath the burqa.
Second, in a criminal case such as this one, testimony is more crucial than in a civil procedure. Namely, criminal cases depart from the relations between two parties and become a matter of public interest. The public has the right to a transparent and open criminal justice system and has an interest in the conviction of criminals. On the other hand, part of the defendant's right to fair trial should allow him to cross-examine witnesses whose faces are uncovered. The judge in this case ruled that the court and litigants should be able to see the faces of witnesses. Otherwise, the court stated, how could they know "that the person re-entering the witness box today is the same person who was there yesterday?" The court added that even with visual identification it is difficult to distinguish between people of similar build and facial characteristics. The court emphasized the significance of watching witnesses' faces while they are under cross-examination and the public's right to observe justice unfolding in the courts.
Nevertheless, the court allowed for some accommodations for the witnesses. The court ruled that screens would be used to ensure that only the judge and counsel would see the witnesses' faces while they testified and that the court's staff would be comprised entirely of women. The court also ordered that steps be taken to ensure that the witnesses would not be seen unveiled in the entrance to the courtroom or when they departed. The court specifically mentioned that the witnesses were allowed to express their religious views by wearing a hat or scarf that covered their hair.
Finally, as for bias, the niqab will seem extreme and exotic to some judges, jurors, parties, witnesses, attorneys prosecutors and courthouse personnel. Ethnic prejudice and unfair bias may be amplified by the appearance of veiled women in a US court room.
Recently, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the highest court there) has ruled that women are permitted to wear the niqab while testifying, unless doing so will compromise the defendant's right to fair trial. 64 Such a decision has to be made on a case-by-case basis, and should include a "contextual analysis" in which the court considers all relevant factors. Specifically, the court needs to assess to what degree wearing the niqab actually interferes with the evaluation of the woman's testimony. The court should also conceptualize how central the witness's credibility is to the outcome of the trial, or the specific importance of the witness's identity. The nature of the procedure is also important. For example, in this case, the woman was an alleged victim of sexual assault and the court identified the vulnerable condition of such a woman and stated that removing the veil would make her feel even more exposed. The question of whether the case is a jury case is also important, because it is the jury's role to assess the witness's demeanor, and denying or reducing their ability to do so could jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial. Other factors include the stage of the procedure (if it is at an early stage, the court can let the woman testify wearing the veil and later reassess the decision);
the option of creating "constructive compromises"; the viability and effect of wearing a niqab in different style or made from different fabric, which interferes less with the assessment of behavior, and more. The courts should also consider the larger societal effects such a decision may have. Permitting a Muslim woman to testify wearing the niqab will send a message of acceptance and recognition to the Muslim minority "that many believe is unfairly maligned and stereotyped in contemporary Canada," and will reflect "the multi-cultural heritage of Canada." It will also broaden access to the justice system by allowing all to participate without compromising their beliefs.
The Constitution will not allow a blanket niqab removal policy based either on the need to judge demeanor or veracity, to identify, to compel accountability, or to identify and avert bias. If the state's interest in all of these is compelling, it may interfere with religious free exercise but must do so in the least restrictive manner.
